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Abstract: This paper looks both backward and forward. It starts by comparing the 
accession countries with the EU and by comparing the EU’s 2004 eastern enlarge-
ment with previous enlargements. It appears that the EU became poorer by every 
single enlargement. The EU’s GDP per capita decreased each time relative to GDP 
per capita of the six founding member states.  
There appear to be good economic reasons for the postponement of Roma-
nia's accession until 2007. Romania did not achieve macro-economic stability as 
fast as the other accession countries, its welfare level was lower and its progress in 
establishing a market economy was slower compared to the countries that joined the 
EU in 2004. In addition, it has realized little progress in the fight against corrup-
tion. A possible explanation for Romania’s poor economic performance in the 1990s 
is the partial reform paradox. 
 The paper also looks at the EU’s prospect in view of the rejection of the 
draft constitutional treaty by the French and Dutch voters. It presents four options. 
The most likely seems that the EU will proceed on the basis of the Nice Treaty and 
political agreements. Further enlargements will be much more difficult to realize 
than in the past.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
Immediately after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe 
there were high hopes for a favorable economic development in the region. The 
reason was, of course, that there was so much scope for improving productivity that 
the economies in Central and Eastern Europe would grow rapidly after the upheav-
als. The communist economies were mainly supply-driven rather than demand-
driven and were therefore unable to provide their citizens with welfare levels that 
were comparable to those in western market economies. Productivity in the com-
munist countries had been low and output per worker was actually declining. Even 
in the Baltic States, which traditionally were economically more developed than the 
other Soviet republics, there is some evidence that the decline towards collapse 
already started in the mid-1980s (van der Hoek and van Miltenburg, 1996).  
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The collapse of communism was followed by a long and deep recession ra-
ther than an economic boom despite the fact that the European Union offered finan-
cial support to help the countries of Central Europe in coping with drastic economic 
restructuring and political change. As early as 1989 the EU set up the Phare program 
(Poland Hungary: Assistance for Reconstruction of the Economy). In addition, the 
European Union signed the first Europe Agreements in December 1991 (with Pol-
and and Hungary). These agreements offered trade concessions and other benefits 
normally associated with full European Union membership (Schoors and Gobbin, 
2005). More Europe Agreements followed suit including the agreement with Roma-
nia in 1993. Eventually, this process resulted at the Copenhagen European Council 
of December 2002 in a proposal of membership for ten applicant countries by May 
1, 2004. The applications of Bulgaria and Romania were put on hold, but the Co-
penhagen Council clearly communicated the intention to welcome them as members 
in 2007. However, the accession year could be further postponed to 2008 if these 
countries had made too little progress. 
 Table 1 shows the relative importance of the accession countries at the time 
of their applications in the mid-1990s. Although their combined populations 
amounted to 28% of that of the EU-15, their combined total GDP amounted to only 
4% of that of the EU-15 at current prices or 9% at purchasing power standards. GDP 
per capita in the applicant countries amounted to 13% at current prices or 32% at 
purchasing power standards. Thus, the applicant countries were poor relative to the 
EU-15 and their economic weight is very small despite their sizeable populations. 
 
Table 1. The 10 applicant countries in Central and Eastern Europe as a percen-
tage of the EU, 1995 
 
Area Popula-
tion 
Total GDP 
(current 
prices) 
GDP per 
capita (cur-
rent prices) 
Total GDP 
(purchasing 
power) 
GDP per capita 
(purchasing 
power) 
33 28 4 13 9 32 
Source: European Commission, Agenda 2000 - Volume II - Communication: The 
effects on the Union's policies of enlargement to the applicant countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Impact study), p. 68. 
 
 The Eastern enlargement is often labeled unprecedented. Table 2 compares 
the 2004 enlargement with three previous enlargements: 
1. The 1973 Western enlargement, when Denmark, Ireland, and the UK joined the 
EU-6 of the founding member states (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands). 
2. The Southern enlargement of the 1980s, when Greece (in 1981) and Portugal and 
Spain (in 1986) joined the EU-9. 
3. The Northern enlargement in 1995, when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined 
the EU-12. 
In terms of area the Eastern enlargement is similar in size to the first enlargement in 
1973, but smaller than the enlargements in the 1980s and in 1995. In terms of popu-
lation the Eastern enlargement is similar to the enlargements in 1973 and the 1980s, 
but considerably larger than the enlargement of 1995. Total GDP increased some-
what less than the population both in 1973 and in 1995, but after the Southern en-
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largement of the 1980s the increase of GDP was much smaller than that of the popu-
lation. In fact, the result of each enlargement has been a decrease of GDP per capita. 
Thus, the EU became poorer by every enlargement and after the Eastern enlarge-
ment GDP per capita in the EU decreased to 75% of that of the original six mem-
bers. The 2004 enlargement was unprecedented in terms of the number of accession 
countries, their diversity and their welfare levels, but not in terms of area and popu-
lation. 
 
Table 2. Impact of successive enlargements of the EU (based on 1995 data) 
 
 In-
crease 
in area 
Increase 
in popu-
lation 
Increase 
in total 
GDP 
Change in 
per capita 
GDP 
Average per 
capita GDP 
(EU-6 = 100) 
EU-9/EU-6 31% 32% 29% - 3% 97 
EU-12/EU-9 48% 22% 15% - 6% 91 
EU-15/EU-12 43% 11% 8% - 3% 89 
EU-26a/EU-15 34% 29% 9% - 16% 75 
a. Cyprus is not included. 
Source: European Commission, Agenda 2000 - Volume II - Communication: The 
effects on the Union's policies of enlargement to the applicant countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Impact study), p. 24. 
 
 
 2. Romania: a comparative perspective 
 
 In order to assess whether or not the EU was right in delaying Romania’s 
accession to 2007 I will compare the economic developments in Romania with the 
average performance of Romania’s own region - South East Europe1 (SEE) - and 
that of Central and Eastern Europe plus the Baltic States2 (CEE+BS). To this end I 
present a number of data providing some insight in the economic performance of 
SEE, CEE+BS and Romania. Figure 1 shows that CEE+BS already experienced 
continuous positive growth rates from 1993. The same holds true for SEE although 
at a lower level, whereas 1999 saw negative growth. Romania experienced positive 
GDP growth for several years in the mid-1990s followed by negative growth in the 
late 1990s. In the period 1997-1999, Romania was the only EU accession country 
with negative growth rates in three consecutive years.3 From the turn of the century, 
however, growth rates turned positive in the whole region and tend to converge.  
 Figure 2 displays the results of developments in the period 1990-2005 in 
terms of real GDP level in 2005 relative to that in 1989. In 2005, real GDP in 
CEE+BS was one third above its 1989 level due to the region’s relatively high 
growth rates.4 SEE’s real GDP was almost back at its 1989 level (97%), whereas 
Romania’s GDP (105%) has exceeded its 1989 level.  
                                                             
1
 Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, FYR Macedonia and Romania. 
2
 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (CEE) and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (BS).  
3
 The second worst performing country was the Czech Republic with negative growth rates in 1997 and 1998.  
4
 Not shown in Figure 2 is that the slowest development occurred in Moldova (47%) and that real GDP in 
the former Yugoslav republics ranges from 60% (Serbia) to 88% (FYR Macedonia) of its 1989 level 
Albania’s performance (137%) is comparable to that of CEE+BS.. 
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Figure 1. Real GDP growth (in %), 1990-2005 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Romania CEE+BS SEE
Source: EBRD, Transition report, London, EBRD, various years. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. GDP level in 2005(1989=100) 
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Source: EBRD, Transition report, London, EBRD, various years. 
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Another way of looking at GDP levels is by relating GDP per capita to the 
average of the EU-15 (see Figure 3). Slovenia is the richest of the new member 
countries with a GDP per capita of 74% of the EU-15 average, which is almost as 
high as that of Greece, the poorest EU-15 member state. Romania has the second 
lowest GDP per capita, only Bulgaria’s is lower. As shown in section 1, the Eastern 
enlargement of 2004 is considerably smaller in economic terms than the first en-
largement of 1973, even though the increase in population is in the same order of 
magnitude. 
 
Figure 3. GDP per capita in purchasing power standards as a percentage of the 
EU-15 average, 1996 and 2005 
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Source: Eurostat, Europe in figures. Eurostat yearbook 2006-07, Luxembourg, Eu-
ropean Communities, 2007, p. 152. 
 
 
 A measure for a country’s attractiveness to foreign investors is the inflow 
of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). The absolute amount of FDI is not very signif-
icant, as this will largely depend on the population size. Figure 4 shows, therefore, 
the cumulative FDI-inflow per capita in the period 1989-2005. Obviously, Roma-
nia’s attractiveness to foreign investors was limited, which is quite representative for 
the region. Although Romania has done considerably better than the former Soviet 
republics in the region (Moldova and Ukraine), Romania’s performance ($1,110) is 
considerably worse than that of CEE+BS ($2,714). 
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Figure 4. Cumulative FDI-inflow per capita in US$, 1989-2005 
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Source: EBRD, Transition report 2006, London, EBRD, p. 38. 
 
 
Figure 5. Private sector share in GDP, 1990-2006 
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 The private sector share in GDP is a key indicator for the reforms needed 
for the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. Figure 5 displays to 
which degree selected countries have made progress in their privatization efforts. 
Insofar the countries selected are representative for their regions the familiar pattern 
emerges: early reforms in CEE+BS, slower reforms in SEE en the slowest reforms 
in the former Soviet republics. One may wonder, however, how significant these 
data are. First, one may doubt how accurate they are. Second, the data do not indi-
cate what one may call the quality of the privatization process. The strong increase 
in Ukraine's private sector share in the early 1990s, for example, may indicate a 
Russian type of privatization, i.e., a very small group of oligarchs capturing state 
assets for next to nothing.  
 
Figure 6. General government balances (as a percentage of GDP) 
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Source: EBRD, Transition report, London, EBRD, various years. 
 
 
 Figure 6 shows developments regarding general government balances, an 
issue that has received relatively little attention. In the early years of the transition 
deficits were particularly high in SEE. However, Romania followed the pattern of 
CEE+BS rather than that of its own region. By the mid-1990s deficits came under 
control in SEE and the differences between CEE+BS and SEE became small. Ro-
mania has done quite well with regard to its general government balance and meets 
the EMU-requirement of 3% from 2002. From 2003, this also holds true for 
CEE+BS and SEE, but not for each individual country. Two countries in CEE+BS 
exceed the EMU-criterion with regard to the budget deficit: Hungary (with a deficit 
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of 8.6% in 2006) and the Czech Republic (3.3% in 2006).5 In SEE it is Albania that 
exceeds the EMU-criterion (with a projected budget deficit of 4.1% in 2006). 
 Finally, I will pay attention to a non-economic dimension that nonetheless 
affects the economic performance: the extent of corruption as measured by Transpa-
rency International in its Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Table 3 displays the 
amount of perceived corruption among public officials and politicians over time in 
the EU member states. Corruption is defined as the misuse of public power for pri-
vate benefit. The CPI 2006 includes 12 sources originating from 9 independent insti-
tutions. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corrup-
tion or between petty and grand corruption.  
 
Table 3. Corruption Perception Index, 1995-2006 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
1. (1) Finland 9.1 9.1 9.5 9.6 9.8 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.6 
2. (4) Denmark 9.3 9.3 9.9 10.0 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 
3 (6) Sweden 8.9 9.1 9.4 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.0 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.2 
4. (9) Netherlands 8.7 8.7 9.0 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.8 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.7 
5. (11) Austria 7.1 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 8.0 8.8 8.7 8.6 
6. (13) Luxembourg - - 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.6 8.7 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.5 8.6 
7. (11) UK 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.7 8.6 8.7 8.3 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.6 
8. (16) Germany 8.1 8.3 8.2 7.9 8.0 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.7 8.2 8.2 8.0 
9. (18) France 7.0 7.0 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.3 6.9 7.1 7.5 7.4 
11.(18) Ireland 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 7.7 7.2 7.5 6.9 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.4 
10.(19) Belgium 6.9 6.8 5.3 5.4 5.3 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 
12.(23) Spain 4.4 4.3 5.9 6.1 6.6 7.0 7.0 7.1 6.9 7.1 7.0 6.8 
13.(24) Estonia - - - 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.5 6.0 6.4 6.7 
14.(26) Portugal 5.6 6.5 7.0 6.5 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.5 6.6 
15.(28) Malta - - - - - - - - - 6.8 6.6 6.4 
16.(28) Slovenia - - - - 6.0 5.5 5.2 6.0 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.4 
17.(37) Cyprus - - - - - - - - 6.1 5.4 5.7 5.6 
18.(41) Hungary 4.1 4.9 5.2 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.2 
19.(45) Italy 3.4 3.4 5.0 4.6 4.7 4.6 5.5 5.2 5.3 4.8 4.8 4.9 
20.(46) Czech Rep. - 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.8 
21.(46) Lithuania - - - - 3.8 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 5.0 4.8 
22.(49) Latvia - - - 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.7 
23.(49) Slovak Rep. - - - 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.7 
24.(54) Greece 4.0 5.0 5.4 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 
25.(57) Bulgaria - - - 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.9 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.0 
26.(61) Poland - 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.7 
27.(84) Romania - - 3.4 3.0 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 
 
Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, several years, 
http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html. 
                                                             
5
 It should be noted that these figures are still projections, not realizations (source: EBRD, Transition 
report 2006, London, EBRD, p. 35). 
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The scores range from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt) and relate to 
perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by businesspeople and country ana-
lysts. Respondents expressed their perceptions in surveys assessing a country's per-
formance. At least three sources must be available for a country to be included in the 
CPI. Therefore, in its CPI 2006 Transparency International could include only 163 
countries, which is considerably less than the over 200 sovereign nations in the 
world. The 27 EU member countries listed in Table 3 are ranked on the basis of their 
score in the CPI 2006, while their CPI 2006 ranking is included in parentheses. 
 Northwestern Europe is doing relatively well with scores of 8.0 or higher. 
Italy and Greece were the most corrupt nations in the EU-15 and after the 2004 
enlargement they still belong to the most corrupt EU member states. Only three EU-
27 member countries (Bulgaria, Poland and Romania) are perceived more corrupt 
than Greece. Obviously, Romania is at the bottom of the list with a score of 3.1 
indicating that doing business in Romania is subject to additional risks resulting 
from corruption causing additional uncertainties. Particularly worrying is that the 
corruption is not diminishing over time.  
 The Copenhagen council decided in December 2002 that Bulgaria and 
Romania had to wait for EU membership until 2007, while the accession year could 
be further postponed to 2008 if these countries had made too little progress. Initially, 
the European Commission would publish its proposal on Romania’s (and Bulga-
ria’s) accession year in May 2006. However, in its May 2006 motoring report6 on 
Romania the Commission announced to postpone its proposal to October 2006. 
Whether the accession date of January 1, 2007 could be maintained, would primarily 
depend on Romania’s ability to demonstrate further results in the fight against cor-
ruption by October 2006. After the decision that Bulgaria and Romania could join 
the EU on January 1, 2007, the Commission communicated to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council that the “accession of Bulgaria and Romania demonstrates to 
countries at an earlier stage in their preparations for membership that their ultimate 
goal is achievable”.7 It seems most likely that the Commission, at the time of writing 
(November 8, 2006), did not expect that Romania’s main corruption fighter, Monica 
Macovei, would be dismissed so soon after Romania’s accession. 
 The data presented here make clear that there were good reasons for the 
postponement of Romania's accession until 2007. Romania did not achieve macro-
economic stability as fast as the other accession countries, neither in terms of prices 
nor in terms of economic growth. Its welfare level was lower and its progress in 
establishing a market economy was slower compared to the countries that joined the 
EU in 2004. In addition, it has made little progress in the fight against corruption. 
The fact that Ms. Macovei’s dismissal came so soon after Romania’s accession 
suggests that it might have been better to postpone the accession date further to 
2008. This would have put continued pressure on Romania’s government to advance 
the reforms and the fight against corruption. 
 
                                                             
6
 European Commission, Monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria 
and Romania, COM (2006) 214. 
7
 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, COM (2006) 649. 
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 3. Explaining Romania’s poor economic performance in the 1990s8 
 
 Enterprises in a typical transition economy can be distinguished by history: 
they are new, restructured, or old. Generally, history is related to performance. New 
enterprises are expected to be more productive than restructured enterprises, which 
in turn are expected to be more productive than old enterprises. As markets develop 
and resources are allowed to flow to their most valued uses, the role of history pro-
gressively weakens, and differences in productivity arising from history (old, re-
structured, new) tend to disappear.  
 
 
 
 The political economy of reform can be expressed graphically by tracing 
the paths of winners and losers from the transition. Figure 7 depicts the gains and 
losses in income accruing to three different constituencies at different stages of 
reform in a typical transition economy: 
1. State sector workers, employed in state enterprises and lacking the skills to 
become new entrants in the competitive market. They face a sharp drop in in-
come as market discipline on inherited enterprises calls for downsizing the sec-
tor, with little hope of any substantial recovery with the intensification of 
reform. 
2. Potential new entrants, workers in state enterprises and new entrepreneurs with 
skills to become new entrants in the competitive market. They have a classic J-
curve pattern of income. They face significant adjustment costs at low levels of 
                                                             
8
 This section heavily draws on The World Bank (2002), Chapter 9. 
 Figure 7. Winners and Losers from Reform 
 
Income New entrants 
gains 
 
 
 
 
 Oligarchs and insiders 
 
O 
 R1 R2 R = Extent of reforms 
 
 
 
  State sector workers 
 
 
R1 = point at which income gains of oligarchs and insiders are maximized 
R2 = level of reforms that allows the winners of reforms beyond R1 (new entrants) 
to compensate for or exercise enough political pressure to neutralize the resis-
tance of oligarchs, insiders, and state workers. 
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reform as they exit the state sector. In addition, they realize gains only when 
enough progress has been made with policy and institutional reforms to promote 
and support new entry into the competitive market. 
3. Oligarchs and insiders. They began the transition with substantial de facto con-
trol rights over state assets, while they have close ties with the political elite in-
herited from the previous command system. However, because of limited skills 
to compete in the market economy, they face an inverted U-curve of income 
gains. They are the immediate beneficiaries of liberalization and privatization, 
as de facto control rights over state assets can be converted into de jure control 
and cash flow rights. They reap concentrated gains in the early stages of reform 
from the opportunities for arbitrage and rent seeking that arise if liberalization 
and privatization are not combined with market discipline and encouragement of 
new entrants. But these gains dissipate as further reforms lead to increasing 
competition and market entry. 
 Given these patterns of gains and losses, each constituency prefers a differ-
ent combination of reforms. For potential new entrants, the reform process offers 
only sacrifices at the beginning of the reform process, but gains when the reforms 
are further advanced. State sector workers prefer the status quo (point O), so they 
reject all reforms. Oligarchs and insiders prefer a partial reform and sustain the 
reform process through R1, the point where their gains are maximized. Beyond this 
point further implementation of policies of market discipline and support of new 
entrants threaten to undermine gains from rent seeking. It is precisely such partial 
reforms - liberalization without market discipline and with selective encouragement 
- that make capture of the state by oligarchs and insiders a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
This has led to a so-called partial reform paradox in many transition econ-
omies in which governments lack credibility and are highly susceptible to state cap-
ture. If potential new entrants believe at the outset of transition that oligarchs and 
insiders will be able to block anything more than partial reforms, they will discount 
substantially the potential gains from any proposed radical reforms. Therefore, they 
will support partial reforms that offer lower costs early in the reform process, even 
though they are more likely to lead to barriers to entry. Public support for radical 
reforms thus depends on perceptions of government credibility in its commitment to 
follow through with such reforms. 
 This analysis leads to the conclusion that there is a high risk of getting 
stuck at a low level of reform (R1) characterized by liberalization without market 
discipline and limited encouragement of new entry. As both insiders and state sector 
workers face declining incomes after R1, these groups have a strong incentive to join 
forces to oppose further economic reforms. This may explain the situation in Russia 
and, to a lesser extent. in Romania.9 By recognizing that different combinations of 
reforms produce different configurations of winners and losers, the framework of 
market discipline and encouragement of new entrants suggests two political chal-
lenges in promoting economic reform: 
1. Securing the support of potential new entrants for comprehensive reforms until 
wider efficiency gains from discipline and encouragement are realized. 
                                                             
9
 This political economic analysis of reform may also partly explain the current political situation in 
Romania if and insofar this is a struggle between those who are in favor of partial reforms and those who 
favor more radical reforms. In comparison with Russia, however, Romania has the invaluable advantage 
of EU membership implying outside pressure to continue the reforms. 
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2. Preventing the early winners from liberalization and privatization from under-
mining further reforms that would impose discipline and support new entry and 
competition and thus reduce their rents. 
 To advance reforms, governments should focus on smoothing the curves of 
winners and losers (as shown in Figure 7) at the initial stages of reform. This means 
lowering the adjustment costs for potential new entrants and reducing the high con-
centration of gains to oligarchs and insiders. One way to do this is by strengthening 
the provision of basic public goods, such as secure property rights and a legal and 
judicial system. In this respect Romania’s Europe Agreement has been instrumental, 
in that it has helped Romania to meet the Copenhagen criteria (in particular the ad-
ministrative criterion, i.e., the ability to take on the acquis communautaire). Another 
way is by reducing excessively high marginal tax rates and broadening the tax base 
that promotes entry of enterprises from the unofficial to the official economy. This 
can break the vicious cycle of informalization, lower tax revenue, and further inten-
sification of tax rates on a shrinking base.  
 
 
 4. EU Prospects 
 
The Nice Treaty (February 2001) called for "a deeper and wider debate 
about the future of the European Union". The Laeken European Council (December 
2001) followed up by adopting a "Declaration on the future of the European Union" 
that explicitly referred to World Wars I and II that weakened Europe’s position in 
the world. This brought a growing realization that “only peace and concerted action 
could make the dream of a strong, unified Europe come true”. The declaration com-
mitted the EU to greater democracy, transparency and efficiency, and to preparing a 
constitution for European citizens. The latter was done by the European Convention 
on the Future of Europe, which presented a draft constitutional treaty to the Euro-
pean Council on June 20, 2003.  
On June 18, 2004, the European Council adopted unanimously the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe beginning with the words “Reflecting the will 
of the citizens…”. The 25 member states signed it in Rome on October 29, 2004 
after which the member states still had to ratify it. Ten countries had already done so 
before the French voters rejected the constitution on May 29, 2005. The Dutch vot-
ers also rejected it on June 1, 2005, but one day later the Latvian parliament ap-
proved the constitution (on June 2, 2005). Eighteen member states10 have approved 
the Constitutional Treaty, two (France and the Netherlands) have rejected it and the 
remaining seven member countries have not yet decided. 
From the legal perspective it is very difficult to proceed with the EU after 
the “No” vote by two founding EU member states, but politically it is not possible to 
stop. Also without a constitution the EU continues to function. Examples are that the 
European Council reached a compromise on the financial perspectives 2007-2013, 
that the EU agreed on an open-skies transatlantic aviation deal with the USA, the 
EU agreed on a climate-change plan, etc. Thus, it would be wrong to say that the EU 
                                                             
10
 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. See 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/constitution/ratification-eu-constitution-state-play-member-states/article-
130616. 
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is unable to make decisions. It still makes decisions, often unanimously, as the 
above examples show. Undoubtedly, the EU will continue to function and to make 
decisions even though the French and Dutch voters rejected the draft constitutional 
treaty in May/June 2005. 
 When the constitution was signed, it was agreed that if some members 
would have problems with ratification, the European Council will decide what to do 
next. Now there are ratification problems in France and the Netherlands it seems that 
there is a number of options including: 
1. A re-run of referendums that resulted in a “No”. The Luxembourg prime-
minister Juncker proposed this while he held the (rotating) EU-presidency. How-
ever, this seems something of the past, not of the present.  
2. The countries that rejected the constitution leave the EU. However, the current 
treaties do not provide for secession. The constitution does, but is not in force. 
Moreover, it would be politically inconceivable that two founding member states 
would leave the EU. 
3. Apply the constitution to those countries that accepted it: an EU of two blocks. 
This would require adjustments of the constitutional treaty. Therefore, it should 
be subject to a new ratification procedure.  
4. Draft an abridged version (as the Finnish MP Kimmo Kiljunen in an early stage 
proposed). This might be a possibility to avoid the need of new referendums in 
France and the Netherlands and possibly also to avoid holding referendums in 
the countries that have not yet decided (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, UK). 
5. Proceed on the basis of the Nice Treaty and political agreements: a diverse union 
rather than an ever-closer union. 
In the long run, unity might still emerge. In the short run, however, the EU 
will most likely evolve as it has been evolving over the past: multi-tiered as the 
following three examples illustrate: 
 Not all EU countries participate in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). For 
the EU-15 member states it was optional to participate in EMU or not. Den-
mark, Sweden and the UK have refused to join EMU and still have their nation-
al currencies.11 
 Some EU countries have opted out from certain policy areas. The UK, for ex-
ample, has opted out of the Social Charter, while Denmark, Ireland, and the UK 
have opted out of provisions related to asylum, immigration, and visas. 
 The Schengen treaty shows that cooperation between a majority of EU member 
states with outsiders (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) is possible. NATO is 
an example of cooperation between a minority of EU member states and outsid-
ers. EMU and the Prüm Treaty show that part of the member states can collabo-
rate as a group within the EU without participation of the other member states. 
This illustrates that a kind of multi-speed EU has already been realized and is 
functioning. 
The most important consequence of the Constitution’s rejection by the 
French and Dutch voters seems that further enlargement of the EU will be much 
more difficult to realize than in the past. This applies to Croatia and Turkey with 
                                                             
11
 Interestingly, the new member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 do not have a choice. As 
soon as they meet the EMU criteria they must join EMU. 
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whom the EU opened accession negotiations in October 2005. In addition, it applies 
to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that received the status of candidate 
country in December 2005, but with whom accession negotiations have not started 
yet. And it also applies to the other countries of the Western Balkans that are poten-
tial candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia 
including Kosovo under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244). 
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